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Abstract
We study how sponsored ads which are classically
inserted in Web pages could also be inserted in
XML documents such as Ebooks. Advertisers set
prices for words and DTDs, and a Vickrey
mechanism would select an ad for some price.
The approximate distance between a
document and any DTD, which is easy to compute,
allows to associate a value to a new document in
such a market, as a combination of the price and
the distance.
We describe a simple auction for one ad and
its generalization to several ads.
Keywords: XML, distances, auctions, value of
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Introduction
There is a large source of new documents in
normalized XML formats, which can be freely
distributed : short novels, technical documents,
catalogs. This is a new market for sponsored adds.
We consider an economic setting, where
sponsored ads can be inserted into XML documents,
in particular Ebooks viewed as specific XML
documents, and where advertisers target DTDs
(Data Type Definition, i.e. XML Schemas) which
generalize the classical keywords and capture the
structure of the documents. As for sponsored ads
such
as
GoogleAdWords
where
the
advertisers define an ad and set private prices for
sets of keywords, the advertisers define a similar
ad but set private prices for several DTDs. We

study a mechanism, inspired by Vickrey auctions
which will allocate an ad to any Ebook for some
price.
We use an Edit distance between documents
and DTDs, which is easy to approximate [1], even
on Streaming documents and associate to any
Ebook its relative distance 0<d<1 to all the
known DTDs of the central mechanism.
If the
Ebook is at distance di of DTDi, valued for a
price pi, we define its private value as (1- di). pi.
We then set a Vickrey auction [2] on these values:
we allocate the ad with the highest value for a price
of the second best value. We will show that
this mechanism keeps the fundamental Vickrey
properties.
This approach can be generalized to several
ads in a given Ebook, and to several positions
inside the document. In the first case, we allocate
k ads instead of one ad, and in the second case we
consider the distance as a dynamic value over the
streaming document and record the positions which
minimize the distances to several DTDs.
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